On December 3rd, the referendum on the Essequibo organized by Nicolás Maduro’s regime was held. An electoral event that did not have the participation of a very significant part of the population and this was made evident by the completely empty voting centers in the entire national territory.
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However, Maduro’s regime described the election as successful after the results issued by the National Electoral Council in which they stated that there were: “more than 10 million voters”, which generated doubts in the Venezuelan population.
Furthermore and faced with a complex scenario created by the persecution of some opposition political leaders after the consultative referendum, LaPatilla’s team spoke with the director of the Center for Political and Government Studies of the Andrés Bello Catholic University (UCAB), Benigno Alarcón, about what happened on December 3rd, and what is expected to be the likely path to the next electoral contest for the presidency of the republic in 2024.
What is his interpretation of what happened on Sunday, December 3, apropos the referendum on the Essequibo?
-What happened, from my point of view, is what we all saw. There is no need to complicate searching for what happened or on the diagnosis. It was evident that the referendum did not work as the Government expected. The massive participation that tried to be promoted from all levels of the Government using all the state apparatus, using all the media in a campaign that, I would say, was well orchestrated and which was very intense, in the end it did not give desired results.
It is difficult to know how many people could have voted, particularly we did not do a systematized follow-up nor did we have witnesses or people at the tables, but let’s say that the few people that one knew, because they were (designated) table members here and there, more or less coincide in maybe 10% or 15% (participation). I think that this figure may correspond to reality, because at the end of the day we had 28 thousand voting centers, but we did not see any queues at even one center, as well as any significant mobilization of voters.
One piece of information that confirms that participation was very low was the very ambiguous report that was given on Sunday night about the results, particularly when it spoke about votes and not about voters, people interpreted (and realized) that it was talking about two million voters that multiplied for the five questions resulted in ten million answers. The people then confirmed that this was consistent with what had been seen.
Another curious fact that somehow confirms the suspicion that the result was not favorable is the fact that the National Electoral Council (CNE) has not published official results on its website and what we suspect is that this is not going to happen, they will not publish the minutes of the (individual) voting centers.
The reason why the minutes are not published is that they will contrast with the results. It is very difficult to talk about 10 million voters and find that if you take a sample of the published records, what you will find is that they will not coincide, taking into account that the real electoral roll may be between 14 or 15 million voters, talking about 10 (million) in that scenario is a percentage much higher than 70%.
What do you think about the CNE’s performance in announcing three different results in this referendum? According to unconfirmed information, apparently there was no transmission of data from the voting centers, which suggests that these results are fabricated.
-The CNE put itself in a very uncomfortable position to announce results that were unacceptable to the Government itself. I think that was what led to such an ambiguous statement on Sunday night, which required clarification on Monday morning, which far from clarifying, left even more doubts.
What this means is that we do not have official results which are supported by the minutes that must back the official result.
Honestly, I do not believe that there has been no transmission of data, it is very difficult considering that the Government has full control over the communication equipment. There is no way for this transmission not to occur, there are always alternative channels.
What I do believe is that, if the minutes have not been published, it is not due to lack of transmission, but simply because the results transmitted do not resemble the final result.
What do you think is the reading after the low participation of Venezuelans that was evident in the empty voting centers?
-The low levels of participation have nothing to do with a refusal to support the recovery of Essequibo. I think it has to do with a rejection of the Government.
In a recent survey that we had the opportunity to see, and something that we did confirm is that a minority of the population, possibly those who went to vote, thought that the referendum had a real relationship with the problem with Essequibo.
Most people thought that the referendum initiative was more linked to internal political problems. The reality is that I agree with that explanation, and among the reasons why people think that a referendum was called at this time. I think there are several reasons people considered in this appreciation.
I agree with them and that these are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but rather they may be motivations that add to the reason why the referendum was held at this time. There is, on the one hand, the Government’s need to try to unite the population around a nationalist discourse.
Secondly, to contrast the mobilization that could be achieved in the referendum that had no adversaries to that of the Primary, which as we saw did not work either.
On the other hand, it gives the impression that the Government is looking for an issue to polarize the election and place itself on the side where the majority of the people are supposed to be, which is in defense of territorial integrity.
The reality is that I find it difficult for the Essequibo issue to end up taking hold as a campaign tool. I think that basically what we saw on Sunday, December 3rd, was a very high rejection of the Government.
Does the result of the referendum mean a weakening of the power of Nicolás Maduro’s regime?
-Yes, especially in what has to do with the political support and legitimacy of the Government. What became clear in this referendum is that even on issues that could be easy to build legitimacy, the lack of support for the Government makes this impossible.
I’m not sure it weakens it, I think it makes evident the lack of political support that the Government has. I don’t think it (support) will be lost, but it has become visible in an important way after the referendum.
The Government has received two very strong blows in recent weeks: the first, verifying that in the Primary the person who won had much greater support than the Government expected and that it (the primary) could be carried out successfully.
And the second blow, and I think much worse than that of the Primary: the referendum. In it there were no opponents and even opposition actors participated in its favor, at the end of the day this is one more blow. The referendum was an ‘own goal’ that occurred because people saw the opportunity to express their rejection of the Government.
Given this situation, how do you see the outlook for the next elections in 2024? Does your analysis contemplate the scenario of a suspension of the 2024 presidential elections?
-In relation to the electoral panorama of 2024, it will be, without a doubt, tremendously complex. This will not be a normal election, an election in which, to start, the Government sought its legitimacy and that this became the reason for the normalization of relations towards the ‘abroad’, but given the reality of the current circumstances created by the lack of support that the Government has, it seems that the Government already renounced that electoral objective and seems to now desperately seek to maintain power.
It promises to be a conflictive year, a year where it is difficult to predict the Government’s willingness to go to an electoral process under fair conditions.
It seems that the Government does not care, it wants power by hook or by crook. I think it is difficult for the election to be postponed. I believe that the Government intends to make this election as soon as possible. For this reason, it is precipitating actions that we thought we would see for the second half of the year. This may well imply an early election.
We have already seen a Government that through its CNE (National Electoral Council) said that there were 10 million voters, we can expect anything in an electoral process without conditions.
The Government wants the election before that of the United States (elections) in part because of the differences it has with that country.
The latest events suggest a phase of intensification of political persecution in Venezuela, especially of actors directly related to María Corina Machado. In your opinion, what consequences will these actions have for both the opposition and the regime?
-Evidently, this worsening in the face of next year scenario of a lot of political conflict, which may have consequences that derive from the (government’s) relationship with the outside world, for example, with whether or not there is a relaxation of sanctions, but also It can lead to internal consequences such as, for example, the reappearance of mobilizations and protests in Venezuela.
I believe that the Venezuelan people want political change, it was reflected in the participation of the Primary and also by the abstention at the referendum.
It is a topic that must be viewed very carefully. I don’t think the conditions today are the same as other moments of high conflict, such as in 2017. Today there is a process open in the ICC (International Criminal Court), that generates a lot of noise within the state apparatus itself and I think that in some way there is less willingness to do anything to keep the Government in power, unlike in the past where impunity practically reigned. I believe that today the situation is more complicated.